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Why Hannibal Lost the Second Punic War? 
 
Ho Yee Lam 
University of California at Berkeley 
(Berkeley, California) 
 
 
After the First Punic War (264-241 BCE), Carthage tried to regain an empire in the 
Mediterranean by conquering Spain. When Hannibal seized Saguntum, an ally of Rome, he 
ignored an ultimatum from Rome, triggering the Second Punic War. Although Livy (59 BCE-17 
CE) and Plutarch (45-127) presented Roman victory as the will of the gods (a common convention 
in Roman literature), they both support the reasoning of the far more critical Greek historian 
Polybius, who examined how Rome took over the Mediterranean.1 Rome won this long seesaw 
war because of three advantages. Firstly, the geography helped Rome. Secondly, Rome had a much 
larger population. Thirdly and finally, Rome had three excellent commanders: Fabius Maximus, 
Claudius Marcellus, and Scipio Africanus. Carthage, on the other hand, had only one: Hannibal.   
 In the Second Punic War, Rome had an upper hand over Carthage geographically, even 
though the war was fought in the Roman homeland, and they had control of the sea around Italy, 
preventing Carthaginian supplies from arriving. Carthage had lost dominance in the Mediterranean 
after the First Punic War, as Polybius said, quoting the Treaty of Aegaties Islands: “At the close 
                                                 
1 Livy, Plutarch, Polybius were the mainstream historians who recorded the detail of the Second Punic War, and 
they were supported by Dio, Florus, and Appian (the later Roman Historians). Although the Roman sources overly 
glorify Rome in this war, we have no other primary sources to tell the story from other points of view.  
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of the war for Sicily … The Carthaginians are to evacuate the whole of Sicily and all the Islands 
lying between Italy and Sicily … to evacuate Sardinia and pay a further sum of 1,200 talents.”
Rome’s navy saved them from the new Punic invasions.  
3 
Although the Carthaginians’ Navy was limited due to the treaty of 241 BCE, Hannibal built a fleet 
of 52 ships in (218 BCE).4  But even this fleet was never sufficient enough to challenge the Roman 
navy of 220 ships, with which they controlled the seas around Italy, converting the Mediterranean 
into a friendly lake.5 This advantage allowed them to prevent Carthage from supplying Hannibal 
by sea.6 Although Hannibal cleverly created a disadvantage for Rome by using Italy to feed his 
army, hoping the Carthaginians would eat up some of the Roman grain supply,7 control over land 
was contested, and neither Rome nor Carthage dominated it totally. But Rome controlled the sea, 
and  
 The Carthaginian army, under the command of Hannibal, faced a great geographical 
challenge since they had to march from Spain through the harsh mountain terrain of the Pyrenees 
and the Alps into Italy. Without a large fleet, Hannibal could not take any risks by sea, so he chose 
to march his army over land. Polyb said Hannibal’s army originally had 50,000 infantry, 9,000 
                                                 
3 Polyb. The Histories 3.27.1-8; Liv. The History of Rome 21.19-20 has very similar terms as Polyb. 3.27 and 
Appian Roman History 5.2.2 
4 Polyb. 3.33.14 
5 Polyb. 3.41.2; Liv. 21.17.3; App. 6.3.14  
6 In 1890s, Captain Alfred Mahan, the lecturer and president of the United States Naval War College, argued that 
America could not sustain its oversea market and territories without the protection of its strong naval in his book, The 
Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783. He explained Britain could maintain her empire, because her navy 
protected her trade routes and were able to eliminate the other European rival’s naval power. He pointed out the 
importance of naval supplies between the mainland U.S. and her oversea territories militarily and economically, and 
his idea eventually encouraged the U.S. to expand her navy to protect its oversea interests and military sea supplies. 
Moreover, Chester G. Starr also had a similar opinion. Through his book, The Influence of Sea Power in the Ancient 
History, he said the the sea transportations were the main elements to achieve victory in the Peloponnesian War and 
the Second Punic War. The ships were mainly used to transport large amounts of troops in a fast manner effectively 
and secure supply routes. It also prevented enemies to supply their own troops and maneuver their troops without 
inflicting heavy casualties under natural causes. Starr said sea power was the main element to win wars in the Ancient 
Warfares.   
7 The Romans needed to plants the field to support their large populations, but the Carthaginians harvested the 
Roman crops during the war. Carthage intended to use Roman resources to feed his army, because there were only 
few supplies reaching to Hannibal.  
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calvary, and 21 elephants.9 The land route from Spain to Italy was too long and rough for 
Hannibal’s army and took many lives. “The whole march from New Carthage had taken [Hannibal] 
five months, and he spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, and … the army that was left to him 
had ...” 20,000 infantry, 6,000 calvary, and 12 elephants, and the Romans had “250,000 foot and 
about 23,000 horses … the total number of Roman and allies able to bear arms was more than 
700,000 foot and 70,000 horse.”10 Moreover, Polyb also said “[Hannibal] had lost many men by 
hand of the enemy in crossing of rivers and on the march in general, and the precipices and 
difficulties of the Alps had cost him not only many men, but a far greater number of horse and 
pack animals.”11 The land ineffective land route took a long time and cost Hannibal more than 50 
percent of his men by way of death and desertion. Although Hannibal possessed a fine army 
initially, his numbers shrank before he reached Italy. Before the first battle, Rome had no casualty, 
but Hannibal had lost 25,000 men to the nature. Eventually, Hannibal recruited Gallic mercenaries 
in Cisalpine Gaul who were angry over recent Roman expansion near Cremona.12 Despite heavy 
losses accrued during the journey, Hannibal defeated the Romans at Trebia and Ticinus in 218 
BCE. Although Hannibal achieved many victories during his Italian campaign, only once did he 
receive reinforcements from home.13 The rough and dangerous land route made it impossible for 
Hannibal to replenish his army effectively. In fact, when his brother brought an army across the 
Alps to help Hannibal, he was intercepted and destroyed by the Romans at the battle of Metaurus 
                                                 
9 Polyb. 3.38; Liv. 21.22 provided the number of elephants, but Ployb. did not. 
10 Polyb. 3.56.3-4 
11 Polyb. 3.56.1 
12 Liv. 21.25.2 
13 Liv. 23.42: Only once were the Carthaginian able to evade the Roman fleet and bring supplies and reinforcements 
to support Hannibal in Italy in 215 BCE. Bomilcar arrived in South Italy with an army from Carthage by sea. 
Hannibal met up with him and combined the two armies together (Liv. 23.41-43). However, it was not enough to 
support a long term war over a decade.  
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River in 207 BCE without Hannibal’s knowledge. Hannibal learned of Hasdrubal’s march only 
when he received the decapitated head of his brother via catapult mail.14   
 
 
Map. The Second Punic War (218-201 BCE). Source: Bret Mulligan, Cornelius Nepos/Life of 
Hannibal 
 
 The Roman Republic had the ability to suffer heavy casualties in a long war because of 
their large draftable population. They also received support from the soldiers of the socii (allies) 
in most of the war. Although Polyb might exaggerate the total number of Roman troops and allies, 
his data suggests that the Roman Republic had a herculean ability to draft hundreds of Roman 
citizens to serve in her cyclopean army. After Hannibal defeated the Romans at the Battle of 
Cannae in 216 BCE, some of the Southern Italian allies, including Capua (the second largest city 
in Italy), deserted Rome and joined Hannibal. Despite multiple defeats, Rome still had enough 
men to establish enormous legions in a short period of time. 
                                                 
14 Liv. 27.51.11; Florus Epitome of Roman History 1.22.49-53; Dio Roman History 15.9.1; Polyb. 11.2-3: he said only 
Hasdrubal was killed in battle. 
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 On the other hand, Carthage did not have a huge draftable population to support the war, 
so they were not able to suffer heavy casualties. This weakness allowed the wiser Roman 
commanders (Fabius’ plan) sap Hannibal’s manpower, which was mixed between Carthaginians 
and mercenaries. Although Hannibal kept winning battles and inflicting heavy casualties, he could 
not win the war because he did not have enough men. The mercenaries would desert from 
Hannibal’s ranks if their lives were always in danger.15 Hannibal invaded Italy with too small an 
army to fight a long war. Hannibal had a fixed number of soldiers which he could not replace 
easily (although he had false hope he could recruit Italians).16 While the Romans were able to take 
risky military maneuvers and trade casualties man for man, Hannibal could not. Although Hannibal 
was able to capture a few Southern Italian cities, he was never able to capture Rome.17  According 
to Polyb “Hannibal at the same time quitted New Carthage with his army and advanced towards 
Saguntum … At length after eight months of hardship and anxiety he took the city by storm.”18 
He pointed out that the Carthaginians were weak in siege warfare because they spent eight months 
to capture Saguntum with difficulties. Saguntum was a city significantly smaller than Rome. If 
Hannibal had difficulty in taking a small city near his home base, he would never be able to capture 
the city of Rome with insufficient forces.  
Whenever an Italian city defected from Rome to Carthage, he had to give them a garrison 
of his men to protect them. Later after he had left, the Romans would attack and destroy the 
                                                 
15 Liv. 22.43.1-6: In 216 BCE some of Hannibal’s mercenaries threatened to desert because of serious starvation and 
arrears of pay. Some rumors even said that the Hannibal’s Spanish mercenaries intended to join the Roman army to 
save themselves from starvation, so Hannibal would need to abandon his infantry in order to save himself; Dio 15.3: 
later in 216 BCE some Spanish and African mercenaries deserted Hannibal for Rome. Hannibal had no choice but to 
return to Capua. Absent in Liv. 23.1 and 23.18.     
16 Polyb. 3.56.4 
17 Saguntum was smaller than Rome, but Hannibal took 8 months to capture it. See also Hannibal’s failure to capture 
Casilinum in 216 (Liv. 23.18). Moreover, some Italian cities fought Carthage to death before Hannibal captured them. 
Some cities surrendered to him. Hannibal sometimes received assistance from spies to capture some cities. Some cities 
were not attacked by Hannibal due to geographic difficulties.  
18 Polyb. 3.17.1-17.9 
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garrisons, ultimately reducing the Carthaginian manpower. Every garrison which Hannibal 
deployed was destroyed. As a result, the distance between his army and the garrison became his 
enemy. Fabius Maximus broke the Carthaginian army with each demolished garrison. The longer 
the war, the smaller Hannibal’s army became. With a reduced ability of mustering soldiers, 
Hannibal had little chance of forcing Rome to surrender, allowing the Romans to win the Second 
Punic War in the end.   
 Polyb believes that the Romans had a higher quality of soldiers than the Carthaginians 
because Roman soldiers served the legions as free citizens, were a free people fighting for their 
freedom, children, and homeland, and were willing to sacrifice their lives for honor and nation.19 
Although the Roman soldiers were seasonal citizen soldiers, they had determined hearts and the 
strong will to fight at all costs against the Carthaginian invasion. In their darkest moment right 
after Cannae, they were willing to suffer any extreme to defeat the invaders. This comes partly 
from the false memories of the tyranny of the Roman kings.20  
Compared to the Romans, the Carthaginians had soldiers of a lower quality. This 
assumption was based on the fact that the Carthaginians partly relied on mercenaries. Polyb also 
claims Italians are stronger and more courageous than Africans, and it was unwise for the 
government of Carthage “to depend for maintenance of freedom on the courage of the 
mercenaries.”21 Mercenaries did not have valor and loyalty and fought only for money. They were 
not reliable in the battlefield. Having no loyalty toward Carthage, the mercenaries were unwilling 
to sacrifice themselves totally for the Carthaginian Republic. After Rome defeated Carthage in the 
                                                 
19 Polyb. 6.52.2-8. 
20 Plutarch The Parallel Lives Cato the Younger: Cato the Younger commited suicide for this reason 150 years later 
(70-71). He did not want to live under tyranny of the sole dictator of Julius Caesar. The senatorial power, under the 
leadership of Cato and Metellus Scipio, engaged Caesar in the Battle of Thapsus 46 BCE. The senatorial power lost. 
Cato wanted to defend his dignity as a free Roman, so he committed suicide rather suffered as a unfree prisoner of 
tyranny. 
21 Polyb. 6.52. 
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First Punic War, the mercenaries demanded their wages from Carthage. Carthage refused and 
engaged her former mercenaries in the grueling Mercenaries’ War (Bellum Inexpiable), 241-39 
BCE, in which she suffered many losses.22 Nonetheless, after Carthage finally defeated the 
mercenaries, she failed to learn from this mistake, and she had no choice but to continue to hire 
dangerous, disloyal mercenaries. 
Rome possessed three excellent commanders: Fabius Maximus, Claudius Marcellus, and 
Scipio Africanus. Carthage’s three best generals were Hannibal, his brother Hasdrubal, and 
Hasdrubal Gisco, but both Hasdrubals suffered defeats in Spain, and Hasdrubal Barca was killed 
at Metaurus River in 207 BCE. Although Hannibal defeated four Roman generals, generals who 
were not good military leaders, at Trebbia (218 BCE), Ticinus (218 BCE), Lake Trasimene (217 
BCE), and Cannae (216 BCE), he could not repeatedly defeat the three Roman military experts.24 
Fabius rarely engaged Hannibal when Hannibal’s army was large enough to fight. Later, when 
Hannibal’s army had shrunk, he had too few men to risk a battle against Fabius. Fabius Maximus 
was a very careful general who did not take any risks.  
The Dictator [Fabius Maximus] took over the army … proceeded towards the enemy, 
showing the utmost care in reconnoitring all the various routes, and determined not 
to take any risks anywhere … The Carthaginian [sic.] lost no time in marching out 
his men in battle order to give him the chance of fighting. But when he saw that the 
enemy kept perfectly quiet and that there were no signs of excitement in their camp … 
he [Hannibal] was really in a very anxious state of mind … he would have to do with 
a very different type of commander from Flaminius or Sempronius … Fabius kept on 
high ground, at a moderate distance from the enemy, so that he never lost sight of 
him and never closed with him.25  
 
                                                 
22 Polyb. 1.68-88 is major source for this war 
24 Liv. 13.17 and 46: both texts mentioned Hannibal withdrew from the battlefield, and Marcellus broke Hannibal’s 
army in the Battle of Nola at 216 BCE; Liv. 25.21: Hannibal defeated Fulvius (another victory after Cannae); Liv. 
25.23: Marcellus took Syracuse from  Hannibal's procession at 212 BCE; Liv. 25.40: Marcellus victorious at 
Agrigentum at 212 BCE; Liv. 25.5-10: at 211 BCE, Fulvius and Hannibal fight at Battle of Anio.  
25 Liv. 22.12 
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Plut. also said “Fabius Maximus, who was held in the greatest esteem for his sagacity and 
trustworthiness, his excessive care in planning to avoid losses.”26 Fabius did not engage Hannibal 
in open ground because he understood that Hannibal was a great general. Although Hannibal tried 
to lure Fabius into an ambush, Fabius cleverly realized Hannibal’s trap and confronted him 
indirectly.27 He employed attrition against Hannibal, forcing his army to starve to death. Therefore, 
Fabius’ calculated strategies successfully shrunk down Hannibal’s army by guerrilla technique.28  
At the same time, Hannibal faced repeated attacks from Claudius Marcellus whose goal 
was to eliminate Hannibal’s ability to roam around Italy freely and fight battles. Marcellus was an 
aggressive general who was willing to trade man for man with Hannibal.29 Marcellus was willing 
to fight Hannibal directly too since he knew Hannibal’s forces were limited. According to App, 
when Marcellus was recruiting auxiliaries from the land of Nerbobriges in Spain, one of 
Nerbobriges chiefs, without knowing the Romano-Nerbobriges peace agreement, attacked the rear 
of the Roman army.30 Marcellus determinately laid siege on the Nerbobriges’ city and ordered his 
army to launch a bloodbath there. Marcellus confronted any enemies head to head aggressively 
without hesitation under any situation.  Moreover, after the battle of Cannae, Plut. said 
The people thought they had in him (Fabius Maximus) a general who sufficed for the 
defensive, but was inadequate for the offensive, and therefore turned their eyes upon 
Marcellus; and mingling and uniting his boldness and activity with the caution and 
forethought of Fabius, they sometimes elected both to be consuls together, and some 
made them, by turns, consul and proconsul, and sent them into the field.31  
 
                                                 
26 Plut. Marc. 9.2 
27 Plut. Fab. 19.5-6 
28 Polyb. 89.8-9; Plut. Fab. 22-24; App. 7.3.13-16 
29 Marcellus was a good precedent for General Ulysses Grant. Grant knew that Robert E. Lee did not have enough 
manpower, so Grant was willing to trade casualties man for man, but not prisoners. Although the Confederates offered 
to exchange prisoners with the Union, the Union refused. Grant realized that Lee would run out of men, so Grant 
aggressively confronted Lee in many bloody battles, as if Marcellus did in the Second Punic War against Hannibal.   
30 App. 6.48-50 
31 Plut. Marc. 9.2-3  
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Marcellus was a determined general who never gave up without a fight, although Rome had 
suffered serious losses in previous battles. By marching out of Canusium to challenge Hannibal, 
Marcellus showed Rome had not lost the will to fight. Marcellus confronted Hannibal rather than 
retreating. At the Battle of Nola (214 BCE), both armies suffered heavy casualties in a draw. For 
Roman morale, it was an achievement not to lose another battle to Hannibal, and it also broke 
Hannibal’s string of victories. Plut. commented that “Hannibal himself used to say that he feared 
Fabius…and... Marcellus as an adversary; for by the one [Fabius] he [Hannibal] was prevented 
from doing any harm, while by the other [Marcellus] he [Hannibal] was actually harmed.”32 This 
is why the Romans called Fabius “the shield of Rome” and Marcellus “the sword of Rome.”33 
Hannibal had great respect and fear of Marcellus. Hannibal eventually killed Marcellus in 208 
BCE, but only after suffering many losses.34   
P. Cornelius Scipio, later known as Africanus, used Rome’s strength and Carthage’s 
geographic weakness to bring down Carthage completely. In doing this, he restored the natural 
order of Rome’s geographic strengths and Carthage’s weaknesses, undoing all of Hannibal’s 
efforts by copying Hannibal’s battle tactics and his strategy to fight on enemy soil. Scipio 
understood that Spain was the main Carthaginian base to support Carthage in Africa, but Spain 
was hardly supporting Hannibal’s army due to the distance. Most of the Spanish silver paid 
mercenaries to guard Carthage in Africa, and almost none went to Italy. While Fabius Maximus 
and Claudius Marcellus were holding Hannibal’s army up, Scipio used Roman control of the seas 
to ship his legions to conquer Spain and eventually North Africa. Hannibal was not able to do 
anything about it. Scipio simultaneously defeated both Hasdrubals in Spain. Hannibal finally 
                                                 
32 Plut. Marc. 9.4, 
33  Poseidonius apud Plut. Marc. 9.4: The Romans used to call Fabius the "Shield of Rome" and Marcellus "the 
Sword of Rome." 
34 Polyb. 10.32; Liv. 25.26-27; Plut. Marc. 30.1-4; App. 7.8.50 
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returned to Carthage to fight against Scipio in 202 BCE, but Scipio defeated Hannibal in the Battle 
of Zama. Although Hannibal was a great general, Scipio was better.35  Therefore, Carthage only 
possessed one good general fighting against three excellent Roman commanders. Not surprisingly, 
this deficit of command expertise eventually led to the doom of Carthage. Furthermore, it was 
beyond Hannibal’s or anyone’s ability to fight multiple Roman armies led by capable commanders 
in a long war in which one army contained him while the other armies reversed his gains. Hannibal 
desperately needed a second army in Italy led by a second capable general to guard his conquest. 
As mentioned above, the only time when a second Carthaginian army invaded, it was destroyed 
by Claudius Nero and Livius Salinator, men not even among the top three Roman generals.     
In conclusion, after many Carthaginian victories over Rome in many battles, Rome won 
the war at Zama. The geography, the huge Roman population, and the high quality of Roman 
soldiers and commanders were the main factors which let Rome best Carthage. After the Second 
Punic War, Rome became the sole dominant power in the Western Mediterranean. 
 
 
About the author 
Ho Yee Lam (Sam) is a history major at UC Berkeley. His research interests include classics and 
Roman military history. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Claud. Quad. and Acil. apud Liv. 35.14.5-12;  Plut. Flam. 21.3-4; App. Syr. 2.10: 15 years later, Scipio and Hannibal 
discussed the three greatest generals of history. Hannibal argued Alexander the Great, Pyrrhus, and himself (Pyr. 8.2, 
Mor. Frag., Scip. 2.). Some people believe that Hannibal’s opinion honors Scipio above Alexander.   
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